An unfortunate incident occurred on board a general cargo vessel, resulting in the death of a shore technician after they fell from a height while replacing an antenna on the main mast.
The incident
At the time of the incident, the vessel was undergoing repairs in dry dock. In addition to the vessel crew, two superintendents (Superintendents A & B) were also on board.
Superintendent A had arranged for a shore technician to replace the VHF antenna, and the day before the scheduled replacement, Superintendent A informed the Master, Chief Engineer (C/E), and Chief Officer (C/O) of the planned work. The Second Officer (2/O), responsible for the navigational equipment, was not on board the vessel at that time.
The next day, at approximately 1330 hrs, two technicians boarded the vessel and met with Superintendent A.
The 2/O, who was in a voyage preparation meeting in the conference room (vessel departure was scheduled for the following day), was instructed by Superintendent A to provide safety harnesses to the shore technicians. However, no further information was provided by Superintendent A to the 2/O regarding the scope of the work.
At 1420 hrs, the 2/O provided safety harnesses to the technicians. No discussions were held on the scope or nature of the work and the 2/O remained unaware of the antenna replacement work scheduled on the main mast.
Earlier at 1400 hrs, the 2/O was separately instructed by Superintendent B to check on the navigational equipment in preparation of the voyage, which the 2/O agreed to carry out after the voyage preparation meeting.
At 1450 hrs, the 2/O arrived on the bridge to begin an inspection of the navigational equipment. Shortly after switching on the S-band radar, they heard a loud thud outside the bridge. Upon investigation, they discovered, and realised, that a technician had been working on the radar mast and had been struck by the rotating radar scanner which resulted in a fall of approximately eight meters from the mast to the compass deck.
The technician sustained serious injury and was immediately sent ashore to the hospital for treatment. Unfortunately, the technician succumbed to their injuries and passed away in the hospital later that evening.
Observations
The subsequent investigation showed that the incident occurred due to multiple procedural lapses as follows:
1. Communication breakdown
- The 2/O was unaware of the planned VHF antenna replacement, as the job schedule was not communicated by Superintendent A, the Master, or the C/O.
- There was a lack of coordination. Superintendent B was aware of the scheduled jobs for the day; however, they did not alert the 2/O while instructing the 2/O to check on the navigational equipment.
- The 2/O did not clarify the job scope of the technicians when they requested the safety harness.
- Technicians were not briefed on the safety protocols prior to the task.
2. No Permit-to-Work in place
There was no Permit-to-Work system in place for this job. The working aloft checklist was not completed, and as a result the radar system was not isolated prior to the task and no warning signs were posted on the radar units prohibiting them from being switched on.
3. Lack of supervision
There was no supervision by the vessel crew of the task being performed by the shore technician.
4. Radar activation protocol
Prior to radar activation, as a basic practice and in accordance with manufacturer guidelines, the scanner must be visually checked for any obstructions, such as fouled flag lanyards. If the scanner-clearance protocol had been followed, the person working aloft may have been detected.
5. Improper use of PPE
While the technician was wearing the safety harness, they did not secure it to a strong point and therefore could not prevent themselves from falling when they were struck by the scanner.
Recommendations
1. Undertake toolbox talks and risk assessments
Toolbox talks are to be held before the commencement of the day's tasks. Ensure all relevant personnel are informed of the proposed work plans. Risk Assessment to be conducted, and the tasks that require permits and supervision by the vessel’s crew to be identified beforehand.
2. Implement a formal Permit-to-Work system and lock-out protocol
The Permit-to-Work system should also be implemented for works carried out by third-party / shore technicians. Such technicians should be briefed on the safety protocols prior to any task. Compliance with lock-out / tag-out protocols as needed, including physical locks or “do not use” signage, where appropriate.
3. Designate responsible officers
Designated responsible officers should be appointed during docking maintenance to ensure oversight of all planned works and to ensure compliance with safety procedures. On board safety cannot be delegated to external parties therefore this also applies to work being carried out by third-party / shore technicians.
4. Notice on the radar unit
A notice should be placed on the radar unit in the wheelhouse reminding the user to ensure the scanner is clear of any obstruction before starting the radar.
5. Training on proper use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Crew should receive proper training, and contractors should be briefed on correct PPE usage, with reminders given before each task to reinforce the importance of using the equipment correctly.
The Club hopes that lessons can be learnt from this case to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. With this in mind, we encourage Members to circulate this report widely amongst their fleets and shore side personnel.